|
Ahmadinejad
in
Managua:
WikiLeaks
Reveals
U.S.
Fears
of
Nicaraguan-Iranian
Rapprochement
As
the
west
tightens
sanctions
and
ratchets
up
pressure
on
Iran,
Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad
has
struck
back
at
the
United
States
in
an
unusual
manner
by
touring
through
Latin
America.
This
week,
the
Iranian
leader
was
in
Venezuela
where
he
received
political
support
from
Hugo
Chávez
[for
a
complete
rundown
of
the
Chávez-Iranian
relationship,
see
my
previous
article
here]
and
yesterday
Ahmadinejad
moved
on
to
Nicaragua
where
he
attended
the
inauguration
of
Daniel
Ortega,
a
Sandinista
hero
of
the
1979
revolution
who
was
recently
reelected
to a
third
presidential
term.
The
agreeable
reception
from
Chávez
and
Ortega
comes
at a
welcome
time
for
Ahmadinejad,
whose
country
has
become
increasingly
isolated
diplomatically.
Needless
to
say,
however,
the
U.S.
has
not
been
amused
by
such
geopolitical
theater.
Last
week,
the
Obama
administration
remarked
that
Ahmadinejad's
trip
was
a
sign
of
desperation.
The
tour,
remarked
the
State
Department,
signified
that
Iran
was
"flailing"
for
new
friends
as
sanctions
inflict
real
economic
damage
on
the
Islamic
Republic.
"We
are
making
absolutely
clear
to
countries
around
the
world
that
now
is
not
the
time
to
be
deepening
ties,
not
security
ties,
not
economic
ties,
with
Iran,"
warned
State
Department
spokeswoman
Victoria
Nuland.
Sounding
the
Alarm
Bell
over
Ahmadinejad
As
part
of
its
charm
offensive
in
Latin
America,
Iran
has
opened
an
embassy
in
Nicaragua
and
says
it
will
invest
$1
billion
in
agriculture
projects
in
addition
to
building
a
deep
water
port
in
the
small
Central
American
nation.
In
addition,
the
Islamic
Republic
will
grant
a
loan
for
a
hydroelectric
plant.
Nicaragua
belongs
to
Chávez's
left-leaning
ALBA
alliance
in
Latin
America,
and
currently
Iran
enjoys
"observer
status"
in
the
group.
In
Teheran
recently,
ALBA
member
states
set
up a
trade
exhibition
of
their
products
and
Ahmadinejad
no
less
showed
up
to
the
event.
Thankful
for
Iran's
largesse,
ALBA
nations
have
responded
in
kind
by
defending
Iran's
right
to
pursue
an
ostensibly
peaceful
nuclear
program.
Predictably,
Republican
lawmakers
have
sounded
the
alarm
bell
about
Ahmadinejad's
trip
to
Central
America,
a
region
which
the
U.S.
likes
to
call
its
own
"backyard."
Representative
Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen,
the
chairwoman
of
the
House
Foreign
Affairs
Committee,
has
remarked
that
Ahmadinejad
is
conducting
a
"tour
of
tyrants"
which
demonstrates
Iran's
expanding
interest
in
Latin
America.
"Ahmadinejad's
desire
to
strengthen
ties
with
anti-American
dictators
and
expand
Iranian
influence
in
the
Western
Hemisphere
directly
threatens
U.S.
security
interests,"
she
remarked,
adding
"This
is a
threat
which
we
cannot
ignore."
Ros-Lehtinen
has
pledged
to
hold
hearings
on
the
matter
to
discuss
what
Obama
is
doing
to
counteract
Iranian
influence
in
the
Western
Hemisphere.
From
Bolańos
to
Ortega
Judging
from
secret
State
Department
cables
recently
released
by
whistle-blowing
outfit
WikiLeaks,
the
situation
in
Central
America
was
quite
different
just
a
few
short
years
ago
and
the
U.S.
had
a
willing
diplomatic
partner
in
the
conservative
government
of
Enrique
Bolańos.
In
2006,
the
Nicaraguan
Foreign
Minister
told
the
American
ambassador
in
Managua
that
he
was
"personally
horrified"
at
the
prospect
of
Iran
becoming
a
nuclear
power,
adding
that
he
would
not
support
Iran's
bid
for
a
seat
on
the
UN
Human
Rights
Council.
With
Ortega's
second
reelection
in
late
2006,
however,
alarm
bells
started
to
go
off
at
the
U.S.
Embassy.
Writing
Washington,
U.S.
Ambassador
Paul
Trivelli
noted
that
while
Ortega
"needs
us
much
more
than
we
need
him,"
and
the
new
Nicaraguan
leader
relied
on
U.S.
assistance
programs
and
much-needed
foreign
investment,
nevertheless
the
Sandinista
might
strike
a
more
independent
foreign
policy
toward
Iran.
While
predecessor
Bolańos
had
worked
closely
with
the
International
Monetary
Fund
and
World
Bank,
Ortega
struck
a
number
of
economic
agreements
with
Ahmadinejad.
Turning
up
the
heat,
Trivelli
met
with
Ortega's
new
Finance
Minister
to
declare
that
"U.S.
investors
had
begun
questioning
what
sort
of
economic
model
the
new
government
plans
to
pursue."
Defensively,
the
Nicaraguans
countered
that
they
would
be
willing
to
work
with
the
IMF
and
World
Bank,
but
the
"overriding
objective
of
the
Ortega
administration
is
to
reduce
poverty."
In a
testy
follow
up
meeting
with
U.S.
diplomats,
the
new
President
of
Nicaragua's
Central
Bank
reassured
Trivelli
that
his
country
would
"pursue
prudent
macroeconomic
policy
as a
way
of
sending
the
right
signals
to
investors."
Recent
economic
agreements
with
Iran,
the
Nicaraguan
noted,
weren't
a
reflection
of
Sandinista
foreign
policy
but
rather
represented
"an
acknowledgment
that
Nicaragua
depends
upon
the
largesse"
of
the
Islamic
Republic
for
oil.
Turning
up
the
Pressure
The
Sandinistas
continued
to
adopt
a
defensive
posture
with
the
Americans.
In
early
2007,
officials
at
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
in
Managua
asserted
that
Ortega
wanted
constructive
relations
with
the
U.S.,
but
"some
Sandinista
party
hardliners
object."
To
be
sure,
Ortega
sought
a
"sovereign
foreign
policy,"
but
Nicaragua
differed
with
Iran
over
the
Holocaust
and
had
made
its
position
known
at
the
United
Nations
no
less.
Trivelli
was
apparently
unconvinced
by
such
sincere
arguments,
however,
and
later
joined
with
Spanish
and
German
diplomats
to
express
displeasure
over
"Ortega's
contradictory
statements
and
actions
regarding
foreign
affairs."
At a
private
breakfast
with
Nicaraguan
officials,
the
U.S.
ambassador
remarked
that
Ortega's
efforts
to
"engage
pariah
regimes
such
as
Iran
raise
questions
about
the
new
government's
commitment
to
maintain
an
open
democracy
and
friendly
relations
with
all."
The
breakfast,
Trivelli
noted,
served
to
put
the
Nicaraguans
on
notice
that
"we
and
other
embassies
are
monitoring
investor
relations
closely,
a
message
they
can
use
to
push
back
against
party
radicals
urging
Ortega
to
strengthen
alliances
with
Venezuela
and
Iran."
Lingering
Suspicions
over
Financial
Transactions
The
cables
suggest
that
the
Americans
lacked
hard
evidence
about
Iranian
intentions,
but
were
still
paranoid
that
Ortega
would
branch
out
and
conduct
a
more
independent
foreign
policy.
While
the
Embassy
lacked
reports
of
"suspicious
transactions
involving
Iran
from
any
of
Nicaragua's
financial
institutions,"
Trivelli
pledged
to
revisit
the
question
"if
Iran
steps
up
its
presence
in
Nicaragua."
What
really
seems
to
have
concerned
Trivelli
and
his
peers
was
the
possibility
that
Iran
might
displace
U.S.
financial
influence
in
Nicaragua.
The
ambassador
remarked
that
U.S.
financial
institutions
Citibank
and
GE
Financial
maintained
a
controlling
interest
in
two
of
Nicaragua's
top
four
banks,
and
an
American
owned
a
controlling
interest
in a
third.
HSBC
meanwhile
had
recently
purchased
another
bank
with
operations
in
Nicaragua.
Shortly
after
being
reelected,
however
Ortega
made
disturbing
comments
contrasting
Iranian
promises
of
"unconditional"
assistance
with
the
targeted
projects
of
western
donors.
In
an
effort
to
head
off
Ahmadinejad,
U.S.
officials
warned
Nicaragua
not
to
do
any
business
with
Iranian
financial
entities.
While
the
Nicaraguan
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
pledged
to
pass
U.S.
concerns
on
to
Ortega,
other
officials
were
not
as
amenable
to
U.S.
entreaties.
According
to
the
cables,
one
"stalwart"
Sandinista
official
at
the
Ministry
of
Finance
argued
that
the
issue
of
Iranian
finances
was
"not
relevant
to
his
institution."
The
documents
suggest
that
Ortega
became
more
and
more
combative
toward
the
U.S.
over
Iran
and
relations
became
testy.
In
2009,
the
Nicaraguans
said
"the
region
was
losing
patience
with
the
Obama
administration"
and
expected
the
U.S.
to
move
faster
to
change
development
policies
and
increase
aid
to
the
region.
Defiantly,
Ortega
asserted
the
right
of
Nicaragua
to
develop
relations
"with
whomever
we
want"
as a
sovereign
country.
One
Nicaraguan
official
railed
that
"we
don't
accept
the
imperialism
of
the
U.S.
to
say
who
is
good
and
who
is
bad,"
and
Nicaragua
would
continue
to
pursue
deeper
relations
with
Iran
regardless
of
the
U.S.
position.
All
Revolutions
are
Not
Created
Equal
In
making
overtures
toward
Nicaragua,
Iran
has
sought
to
play
up
the
Islamic
Republic's
revolutionary
tradition.
In
2007,
Mohammed
Roohi
Sefat,
the
Iranian
Ambassador
to
Mexico,
conducted
a
revealing
interview
with
a
Salvadoran
paper
about
Ahmadinejad's
intentions
in
Central
America.
"The
Iranian
revolution,"
Sefat
remarked,
"took
place
the
same
year
of
the
victory
of
the
Sandinistas."
Sefat's
remarks
echo
those
of
Ahmadinejad,
who
remarked
in
Nicaragua
that
the
two
countries
were
joined
by a
"common
enemy."
To
be
sure,
Iran
and
Nicaragua
both
staged
anti-U.S.
revolutions
in
1979.
However,
aside
from
this
common
history
the
two
countries
share
very
little
in
common
and
I
suspect
that
the
alliance
will
not
prove
very
enduring.
If
the
Arab
Spring
should
pick
up
steam
and
spread
to
Iran,
then
more
moderate
elements
might
take
power.
Mir-Hossein
Moussavi,
Ahmadinejad's
rival
in
Iran's
previously
marred
presidential
election,
said
that
Ahmadinejad's
foreign
policy
moves
had
"isolated"
and
"disgraced"
Iranians
in
the
international
arena.
"Instead
of
investing
in
Iran's
neighboring
countries,
the
government
has
fixed
eyes
and
poured
money
into
Latin
American
states,"
Mousavi
quipped.
"The
President
has
obviously
failed
to
get
his
priorities
right."
Nevertheless,
as
Ahmadinejad
continues
his
tour
in
Nicaragua
and
elsewhere,
we
can
probably
expect
the
usual
saber
rattling
from
U.S.
officials
and
the
mainstream
media
making
the
case
that
Iran
represents
a
true
threat
to
the
hemisphere.
The
bottom
line,
however,
is
this:
though
U.S.
diplomats
would
like
to
make
alarmist
claims
about
Iran's
footprint
in
Central
America,
the
evidence
is
pretty
thin
thus
far.
That
won't
stop
hyperbolic
statements
from
the
Republicans
and
others,
however,
who
still
regard
Nicaragua
as a
virtual
U.S.
enclave.
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